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 Abstract  This paper considers the view that medicine is both “science” and “art.” 
It is argued that on this view certain clinical knowledge – of patients’ histories, 
 values, and preferences, and how to integrate them in decision-making – cannot be 
scientifi c knowledge. However, by drawing on recent work in philosophy of science 
it is argued that progress in gaining such knowledge has been achieved by the accumu-
lation of what should be understood as “scientifi c” knowledge. I claim there are 
varying degrees of objectivity pertaining to various aspects of clinical medicine. 
Hence, what is often understood as constituting the “art” of medicine is amenable to 
objective methods of inquiry, and so, may be understood as “science”. As a result, 
I conclude that rather than endorse the popular philosophical distinction between 
the art and science of medicine, in the future a unifi ed, multifaceted epistemology 
of medicine should be developed to replace it. 
 Introduction 
 In philosophy, clinical medicine is commonly said to have a dualistic nature, to be 
both science and art. 1 How this assumption is interpreted is important because the 
extent to which we view medicine as science rather than art affects our epistemo-
logical expectations of medicine. For example, if we hold that medicine is a science, 
it has been argued we should thus only expect it to meet scientifi c standards of 
inquiry, namely, the acquisition of objective knowledge. On such reasoning, medicine 
need not meet additional moral standards of inquiry, such as being sensitive to 
1  I wish to thank Philippe Huneman for helpful comments on a draft of this paper. 
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2patients’ health care needs and how they are met (Munson  1981 ). But of course, 
medicine without moral sensitivity would be deeply fl awed, as it would forsake a 
basic aim of benefi tting the patient through restoration and healing. Hence, so this 
reasoning goes, we should be persuaded to adopt a  dualist epistemology of medicine ; 
we should recognize two equally fundamental ways of medical knowing: in terms 
of objective scientifi c knowledge of biology and physiology, and subjective personal 
knowledge of the craft of patient care. 
 While I accept that ethical medicine must be sensitive to patients’ health care 
needs and how they are met, the claim that this belief provides a reason to adopt a 
dualist epistemology of medicine is not persuasive. Indeed, I contend this doctrine 
has pernicious affects on our understanding of integral aspects of clinical medicine, 
because accepting it implies that certain clinical knowledge – of patients’ histories, 
values, and preferences, and how to integrate them in decision-making – cannot be 
scientifi c knowledge. Yet, decades of work in clinical decision science suggests this 
knowledge is already being attained and used, altering how clinicians provide care 
(e.g., Weinstein and Fineberg  1980 ; Ende et al.  1989 ; Deber et al.  1996 ;  Stiggelbout 
and Kiebert  1997 ; Levinson et al.  2005 ). If we aim to accurately capture the 
epistemic structure of medicine, including types of knowledge commonly relegated 
to the undifferentiated heap of the “art” of medicine, then this aim motivates a 
reassessment and challenge of the dualist epistemology of medicine. 
 Moreover, recent work in history and philosophy of science suggests that the art/
science distinction rests on deeply fl awed and hackneyed assumptions about 
science, as value free inquiry ( e.g. , Longino  1990 ; Proctor  1991 ; Dupré  1993 ; 
Nelson and Nelson  1996 ; Lacey  1999 ; Douglas  2009 ). Thus, the arguments given 
here against a dualist epistemology of medicine also fi nd a second motivation, of 
questioning a common thesis in philosophy of medicine in light of recent progress 
in philosophy of science. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. It fi rst reconsiders a classic debate over the 
scientifi city of medicine, which shows that the vision of science assumed for juxta-
position with clinical medicine underpins conclusions about the scientifi city of 
medicine. That is, whether we see medicine as a science rather than an art will 
depend chiefl y on the extent to which we believe medicine is inherently “subjective” 
and “value-laden” versus “objective” and “value-free,” and the extent to which sci-
ence is not. Drawing on recent work in history and philosophy of science on the 
conceptual complexity of objectivity and subjectivity (Douglas  2004 ,  2009 ), the 
paper next argues that a dualist epistemology of medicine assumes an antiquated 
dichotomy between pure objectivity and pure subjectivity, where science aims at 
(and achieves) the former and anything that does not is not science. If we reject this 
dichotomy, as it is argued we should, then what is important is no longer whether 
medicine is a science, but the extent to which aspects of clinical medicine may be 
said to be objective, and therefore, amenable to scientifi c methods of inquiry. 
As two brief case studies show, while there remains (and will always remain) a 
degree of subjectivity in clinical medicine, this does not entail that it cannot be a 
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3science, once science is understood as admitting of multiple types of objectivity and 
as incorporating values. 
 Distinctions in the Art/Science Debate 
 Being a Science Versus Being Scientifi c 
 Over 30 years ago, Lee Forstrom argued clinical medicine is not only scientifi c, but 
also is an autonomous science. Following Braithwhite, Forstrom defi ned a science 
in terms of two criteria, whether it has its own natural domain of inquiry and whether 
it aims at establishing general laws explaining the phenomena of that domain ( 1977 , 
8–9). Rendered in light of contemporary concepts in philosophy of science, we may 
interpret Forstrom as arguing that medicine has both a unique domain of inquiry and 
that it aims at robust generalizations. 
 According to Forstrom, the domain of clinical medicine is the living human 
being, which is both its object of inquiry and “its usual experimental context” (15). 
Yet, as human illness manifests across levels of analysis, from molecules and organs 
to organ systems and social systems, the clinician “must interpret and evaluate the 
effects on the organism of social and economic as well as physical and biologic fac-
tors” (9). Thus, medicine’s unique domain is the sum total of levels of analysis 
required to understand health and disease in a living, embodied person. It is not 
simply an aggregate of the other sciences that explain phenomena in these domains, 
such as molecular biology, genetics, physiology, psychology, and economics, 
because medical science synthesizes the results of these domains for the purpose of 
developing knowledge designed for individual patient care. 2 Medicine is thus 
directed at knowledge about patient care rather than about biopsychosocial phe-
nomena isolated from the context of human well being and suffering. 
 In response to Forstrom, Ronald Munson argues medicine is not, and will never 
be, a science, even though it is  scientifi c . Using Forstrom’s criteria, Munson argues 
that despite the fact that the notion of a unique domain of inquiry is vague, medicine 
nevertheless fails to have one. Because, he says, simply identifying a concern with 
the health and disease of living humans, and a requirement that this concern be 
expressed in considerations of many levels of analysis, fails to demarcate medicine 
from other fi elds, such as “medical sociology, epidemiology, bacteriology, bio-
chemistry, and social work” ( 1981 , 186). Moreover, distinguishing medicine from 
these fi elds by appealing to medical intervention as the defi ning aspect of clinical 
medicine will not do, because that would be patently circular. 
2  This depiction accords well with Engel’s “biopsychosocial model of medicine” (Engel  1977 ) and 
the more recent model of “patient-centered medicine” (Bardes  2012 ). 
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4 What is at issue here is the type of generalizations clinical medicine aims at and 
how robust they are. To see this, notice that Munson’s main objection is that not 
only is medicine not a science, but also, it can  never be a science. While Munson 
recognizes that medicine is scientifi c, he rejects the claim that it is a science because 
of how he defi nes science. Munson holds something is a science if and only if it 
aims to generate robust generalizations; thus, the basic aim of science “is the acqui-
sition of knowledge and understanding of the world and things that are in it,” (190), 
no more and no less. For a scientist to justify her work, she “need only demonstrate 
that it is likely to increase our knowledge” (191). For a physician, however, solely 
appealing to increasing knowledge is insuffi cient and actually negligent. Since the 
aim of medicine is “to promote the health of people through prevention or treatment 
of disease,” to justify her work, “the medical researcher must, in effect, present a 
dual justifi cation: (1) the work will increase our knowledge; (2) the knowledge will 
be relevant to the aim of medicine” ( ibid. ). 
 Munson’s response is perhaps the clearest of many attempts in the past three 
decades to justify a common view, that medicine is both science and art. That is, on 
the one hand, it aims at robust generalizations, while on the other hand it aims at idio-
syncratic inferences concerning the treatment of particular persons. Because of these 
dual aims, medicine is bound to be concerned with patients’ assessments of health, 
which entails a consideration of patients’ values. Consequently, Munson concludes 
medicine has an inherently subjective, moral component, whereas science lacks such 
a component because of its function, to generate pure, objective knowledge. 
 Values, Scientifi city, and Objectivity 
 Beneath Munson and Forstrom’s debate lie assumptions about what characteristics 
must be present in order for science to aim at robust generalizations. Specifi cally, 
this debate shows that what justifi es construing medicine in terms of a dualism 
between science and art is another assumed dualism, between inquiries that are 
“value-free” and those that are “value-laden,” where the former pertain to the science 
of medicine and the latter to its art. For Munson, understanding what it means to aim 
at robust generalizations requires conceiving of them in terms of objective, value-
free knowledge of the world. These are the targets of science, whereas medicine 
aims  also at a subjective understanding of the patient. However, by questioning this 
second-order dualism, we can show that there are better ways to understand “science,” 
and thus, better ways to describe the sense in which science and medicine aim at 
robust generalizations. 
 Consider the approach adopted by Gorovitz and MacIntyre in a classic paper 
from the same era. Science, they say, does not only aim at universal knowledge of 
properties, kinds, and generalizations linking one to the other; it also aims at gen-
eralizations about particulars. And, medicine is a science, so understood. For the 
clinician, understanding what makes a particular individual distinctive is para-
mount, even if this understanding comports poorly with medical theory. Whereas a 
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than fuller knowledge of the specifi c features of samples being studied, for the 
clinician working with particular patients, “how such particulars differ from one 
another in their diversity thus becomes as important as the characteristics they 
commonly share” ( 1976 , 59). 
 Gorovitz and MacIntyre’s claim that medicine is a science hinges on their 
rejection of the fact-value dichotomy, which they say gives a false impression of 
the epistemology of science. It is the familiar thesis that sciences generate state-
ments of fact, which cannot entail statements of value, that they contend leads to 
the erroneous view that natural sciences are not concerned with particulars, and as 
medicine is clearly so concerned, that medicine is not a science. 3 For Gorovitz and 
MacIntyre, then, medicine is a science, and that it is so is entailed by an account 
of scientifi city that differs from Forstrum’s and Munson’s. Sciences  are concerned 
with understanding particular phenomena, such as particular hurricanes, tsuna-
mis, election results, and stroke victims. Hence, the fact that medical theory and 
practice are focused on understanding particular patients does not imply medicine 
is not a science. 
 Taken together, the claims made in these classic papers indicate that there are at 
least three different concerns at issue in debates about the dualist epistemology of 
medicine, each of which can be simply rendered in terms of a second-order dualism 
or distinction. One concern is with subjectivity and objectivity, specifi cally as mani-
fested in a dualism between subjective and objective knowledge. Another is with 
value-free versus value-laden types of inquiry, and their relation to the production 
of knowledge. A third concern is captured in the distinction between general expla-
nations and explanations of particulars. 
 Given that each of these three distinctions admits of its own literature, it would 
be foolish to attempt to give a full characterization of any of them here. 4 My aim 
is more modest, namely to show how attending to the assumptions one holds 
regarding each of them supports ones epistemology of medicine, and moreover, 
that certain (more tenable) assumptions suggest that a multifaceted epistemology 
of medicine is warranted, rather than a dualist one distinguishing simply between 
science and art. 
3 As an aside, this claim warrants comment. It is not clear that ethical non-naturalists need be 
troubled by Gorovitz and MacIntyre’s assertion here. They need only deny that factual informa-
tion is suffi cient for informing claims about what is good, not that it can play a (non-suffi cient) 
warranted role in justifying inferences about what is good for a patient or other agent in the 
health care system. 
4  Indeed, for example, the issue of generality in explanation has been with us since the Ancients. 
Ancient Greek thinkers also distinguished between  episteme and  techne , a distinction based in part 
on the claim that the best explanations are those that are timeless and apply with broad generality. 
However, though early Greek thinkers also distinguish between these forms of knowing, as dis-
cussed below (n. 8), these distinctions do not match the contemporary distinction between art and 
science well as it is described here. See Parry ( 2009 ) for a detailed review of the diversity of 
Ancient Greek views on this topic and the many ways they relate to current epistemology. 
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medicine is a science comes down to whether medicine is “purely objective” and 
aims at the accumulation of objective knowledge, or whether it includes an inherently 
“subjective” component. This “subjective” component has been rendered in terms 
of personal values in the debate over the scientifi city of medicine. In this way, we 
see the interplay between the value-free/value-laden distinction and the distinction 
between objectivity and subjectivity, in that medicine is an art if it aims at under-
standing patients’ subjective knowledge of illness in terms that are patently laden 
with the patient’s values. Likewise, medicine is understood as a science in as much 
as it aims to understand patients’ diseases in objective terms, meaning those that are 
disconnected from the values of particular patients and clinicians. 5 
 Distinguishing between general explanations and explanations of particulars 
also relates to the other two distinctions. If understood as a science, medicine is 
taken to aim at knowledge that holds of patients in general, indeed  because it aims 
at objective knowledge, free from the values of particular patients and clinicians. 
And, medicine is art insofar as clinicians aim to skillfully bring these generaliza-
tions to bear on subjectively understood, value-laden illness in particular instantia-
tions; that is, in particular patients. 
 Eric Cassell, a longstanding proponent of the dualist epistemology of medicine 
( e.g. ,  1995 ,  2004 ), provides a paradigmatic example of how these distinctions inter-
relate in philosophical explorations of medicine. Cassell argues that in practice phy-
sicians adopt a narrow understanding of the concept of objectivity and a multifaceted 
understanding of subjectivity. Imagine you feel feverish, he says. You are achy and 
have cold sweats. You feel ill. If you go to a physician and she takes your temperature, 
then, “the reading on the clinical thermometer is an objective measurement of an 
elevation of body temperature. The feeling of feverishness is subjective because a 
feeling can only be experienced by the subject” (Cassell  2004 , 171). This is one 
sense of what it means to be subjective; it is to feel a certain way, which can only be 
felt by you, the subject. There is also another sense, which is associated with your 
ideas  about the way you feel. You may think that your feelings of achiness warrant 
the belief that you have a fever. According to Cassell, that idea is subjective in a 
second sense. Thus, on this view, how you feel and what you reason about your state 
of affairs in light of your feelings are both subjective. But, there is also a third sense 
of ‘subjective’ in medicine: “your  statement that you feel feverish is also considered 
subjective…What the words  mean is not something outside observers can hold in 
common,” hence, they are subjective too ( ibid. ; italics in original). 
 Notice here that for Cassell, being subjective connotes being specifi c, local, and 
particular. Individual persons have particular feelings, ideas, or understandings of 
meaning. However, being objective is associated with generality: a thermometer 
reading is taken to be objective by contrast to being felt solely by the subject – it is 
5  In his  The Wounded Storyteller , Arthur Frank ( 1995 ) develops an account of illness as subjective 
experience and disease as the objective description of that subjective experience in biomedical 
terms. It is in this sense that I use terms such as “illness” and “disease.” 
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7valid everywhere, no matter who wields the apparatus, as long as it is used correctly. 6 
Also, being objective is associated with being general in the sense that there is gen-
eral agreement about objective features of the world, in contrast to the particular 
meaning of statements as understood by specifi c persons. 
 Thus, underlying debates about the scientifi city of medicine are assumptions 
about the meaning of objectivity, which is intimately related to the role of values in, 
and generality of, the target knowledge of interest. It is assumed that the clinician is 
tasked with acquiring two types of knowledge about the patient, objective (scien-
tifi c) knowledge, for which there are general, measurable facts of the matter, and 
subjective knowledge, for which there are particular, incorrigible idiosyncrasies and 
thus, no facts of the matter. 7 
 Objectivity and the Scientifi city of Medicine 
 Now, one may reasonably wonder whether it matters that some philosophers defend 
a dualist epistemology of medicine. There are at least two reasons to think that it 
does. First, if we accept a dualist epistemology of medicine – as inherently both 
“art” and “science”, both “objective” and “subjective,” both “value-free” and 
“value-laden” – then such common activities as a clinician inquiring about a 
patient’s symptoms, beliefs about the genesis of his complaint, or way of speaking 
about his illness, become activities that cannot be objectively characterized. That is, 
if medicine is both science and art, then we must agree with Cassell that “establishing 
a scientifi c basis for dealing with values and human qualities” is “doomed…Instead, 
each physician must solve the problem internally” ( 2004 , 19–20) . 8 Second, another 
6  In contrast to Cassell’s assertion, Hasok Chang’s ( 2004 ) work on the science of thermometry 
shows that the standardization of the activity of measuring “temperature” over hundreds of 
years is what makes this example appear as an innocuous instance of the elucidation of a 
objective fact about a patient. However, Chang’s account of the evolution of the concept of 
temperature shows that such facts require literally centuries of research and debate in order for 
the idiosyncrasies of experimentation to be codifi ed into a broadly accepted physical theory of 
temperature measurement. 
7 Another context in philosophy of medicine where the relationship between objective and sub-
jective knowledge fi gures largely is debates over the meaning of the concepts, health, disease, 
and illness. Beginning with Boorse’s account ( 1977 ,  1997 ), some argue that health has meaning 
by contrast with disease, which is best described in objective, “biostatistical” terms, or in terms 
of species typical functioning. Yet, others argue that these foundational medical concepts are 
thoroughly subjective due to the normative, evaluational aspects of medical reasoning and nosol-
ogy ( e.g. , Nordenfelt  1987 ). And, yet others contend that concepts like health and disease are 
normative  and objective, proposing a hybrid account of sorts (Lennox  1995 ; Schaffner  1999 ). 
Finally, others argue that understanding these concepts philosophically is a quixotic pursuit, 
with no bearing on medical practice (Hesslow  1993 ). Taking a stance on this literature lies 
beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
8  This too is a problem that extends historically to the Ancients. As noted (n. 4), Ancient Greek 
philosophers distinguished between different ways of knowing, including  episteme and  techne . 
However, different thinkers interpreted these terms quite differently. For example, in the 
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8reason that the dualist epistemology matters is that it is common in philosophy of 
medicine ( e.g. , Waymack  2009 ; Saunders  2000 ; Cassell  1995 ; Malterud  1995 ; 
Battista et al.  1994 ), which threatens to distance work in this fi eld from important 
progress elsewhere in philosophy, especially in philosophy of science. 9 That is, 
given the progress made in recent years on the question of whether science is value-
laden or ‘purely objective’ in philosophy of science, if philosophy of medicine 
ignores this work it adopts an antiquated theory of science, which threatens to 
render it obsolete. 
 The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity 
 One way to challenge the dualist epistemology of medicine is to challenge its con-
ceptualization of scientifi c objectivity. In light of recent work in history and phi-
losophy of science, objectivity may be seen as far more complex than discussants 
in the art/science debate suppose. 10 Consequently, the notion of “value-free” 
aspects of clinical medicine is a nonstarter. Therefore, clinical medicine should be 
understood as an integrative science that draws on various methods, which are 
objective by varying degrees. 
 In its contemporary usage, the concept of objectivity is, as historians of the 
notion have put it, “hopelessly but interestingly confused” (Daston and Galison 
 1992 , 82). Following Heather Douglas ( 2004 ,  2009 ), we may distinguish between 
different senses of objectivity implicit in the broader concept by attending to the 
different ways objective claims are  produced . Douglas distinguishes three categories 
of processes that result in objective claims: interactions with the world (such as 
experimentation or observation), individual thought processes (particularly reasoning 
leading to certain claims), and social processes for generating claims (such as polling, 
voting, or collaboration). 
 As illustrated by Cassell above, from the clinician’s perspective, interacting 
with patients may be seen as an instance of an interaction with worldly phenomena. 
 Nicomachean Ethics (especially  Book VI ), Aristotle describes these two types of knowledge as 
more general, in contrast to a third type of knowledge of how to act rightly in particular contexts, 
known as practical wisdom or  phronesis (Aristotle  2000 ). It is fascinating that Ancient Greek 
thinkers took medicine, along with navigation, as an exemplar of practices where all types of 
knowledge were required (Jaeger  1957 ). Although these discussions are clearly relevant to modern 
debates about the epistemology of medicine, contemporary scholars are in agreement that the 
Ancient Greek conceptions of knowledge do not mirror our own understanding of art as a craft and 
science as objective facts (Hofmann  2003 ; Evans  2006 ). 
9  The same might be said for empirical work in applied ethics, however, for the sake of brevity that 
point will not be made here. 
10  This argument could be expanded to draw on the considerable philosophical and historical litera-
tures on objectivity and science (e.g. Nagel  1979 ; Longino  1990 ; Proctor  1991 ), but doing so is 
outside the scope of the present discussion. 
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9Though a patient is a person, he is also a phenomenon to be studied, to be poked 
and prodded, in order to generate evidence for knowledge claims. To make such 
claims, physicians procure evidence through multiple avenues, such as different 
types of diagnostic tests (e.g., genetic, blood, and imaging), and inquire whether 
the evidence supports inferences about the patient’s illness. On Douglas’ typol-
ogy, this is  convergent objectivity, where convergence of suffi ciently independent 
lines of inquiry yields “increasing confi dence in the reliability of the result” 
( 2009 , 119–120). 
 Interacting with patients may also be understood as a social process, for instance, 
of eliciting information about the patient’s illness, of healing, or of deliberating 
about treatment options. These processes may also be understood as generating 
objective claims.  Concordant objectivity occurs when “some set of competent 
observers all concur on [a] particular observation” (126).  Interactive objectivity 
denotes moments where persons deliberate “to ferret out the sources of their dis-
agreements” before certifying a claim (127). In the clinical context, concordant 
objectivity may be exemplifi ed by physician consultations or second opinions. In 
each case, the question is whether multiple observers will agree on a patient’s diag-
nosis, prognosis, and treatment options; if so, then in this sense the agreement con-
veys that these are objective claims about the patient. Interactive objectivity is 
exemplifi ed by treatment decision-making and team-based approaches to clinical 
care, where in both instances persons deliberate over whether a choice is correct in 
light of what is known about a patient. 11 According to Douglas, the more diverse the 
deliberators and the more robust the disagreement and deliberation, the more objec-
tive this type of objectivity will be. 
 Individual thought processes could also be described as objective. In one sense, 
to be objective is to think about phenomena while keeping personal ‘distance’ from 
it. That is,  detached objectivity follows from a “prohibition against using values in 
place of evidence” (120); the investigator is prohibited from appealing to her values 
in making inferences about the happenings of the world. This seems to be the kind 
of objectivity intended by Munson in his characterization of science, where scien-
tists aim at producing general knowledge, and nothing more. Yet, Munson’s charac-
terization of science is ambiguous in that it also implies  value-free objectivity, 
which is more restrictive than detached objectivity, because it denotes a process 
where all values are prohibited from entering into reasoning. If science is character-
ized as lacking an inherent moral principle, as Munson holds, then this suggests 
values are banned from scientifi c reasoning, which is a stronger prohibition than 
that they cannot serve as components of inferences (detached objectivity) or that 
one must adopt a neutral position with regard to the values at play in inquiry ( value- 
neutral objectivity). 
11  For a lively, careful discussion of the philosophical implications of team-based care, see the 
contributions to King et al.  1988 . 
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 Scientifi city and the Epistemology of Medicine 
 Whether clinical medicine is both art and science depends on how one defi nes 
“science”. In the art/science debate, to be a science is to be “value-free,” “objective,” 
and to aim at (robust} generalizations. But as Douglas ( 2004 ) argues, the meaning 
of “objectivity” is irreducibly complex; consequently, the extent to which being 
value-free is a hallmark of science is an open question that depends for its answer 
on the extent to which science exhibits various types of objectivity. Thus, if science 
is not value-free in the requisite sense – of value-free objectivity defi ned above – 
then the claim that medicine is not a science becomes unsupportable. Just as other 
sciences exhibit types, and hence degrees of objectivity, so too does medicine. 
Accordingly, just like other sciences, medicine may be seen as a science despite the 
fact that it is not “value-free.” 
 There are good reasons to think that value-free objectivity is not and should not 
be a hallmark of scientifi c inquiry. As Douglas argues, scientists routinely make 
decisions about research based on various methodological and ethical values. 
Scientists also dispute the relative importance of different epistemic values and their 
implications for hypothesis acceptance. Furthermore, the distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic values is dubious. Finally, scientists have a responsi-
bility to consider the consequences of errors in their reasoning. What follows from 
this is that the role values play in science indicates that the value-free ideal of objec-
tivity is also a nonstarter. Values are ever-present in science; understanding the roles 
they play in inquiry and the extent to which they are justifi ed is what is important. 
 Values play many roles in medical reasoning. Hence, a satisfactory epistemology 
of medicine should not be dualistic, but should be both unifi ed and multifaceted. It 
should be possible to describe the moments where, for example, detached objectivity 
is warranted or inapt, or where convergent objectivity justifi es a claim that is none-
theless challenged through processes described by concordant objectivity. To put it 
another way, if we shift from a dualistic epistemology of medicine to a unifi ed and 
multifaceted one, we may draw upon rich philosophical accounts of the multi- level 
nature of explanation in medicine (Schaffner  1993 ) in order to justify the types and 
degrees of objectivity operative at each level and the extent to which they interact in 
the making of justifi ed medical claims. On such an account, clinical medicine is a 
science through and through, only to be a science is no longer to be “objective” in a 
simple sense of being value-free; rather, to be objective is to be produced by a process 
one can rely on, a process that is likely to be trustworthy. 
 However, though we may be better positioned to evaluate the implications of the 
art/science distinction in medicine by considering recent work in history and phi-
losophy of science, we may nevertheless still believe the dualist epistemology has 
its virtues. Principle among these might be its emphasis on the distinction between 
general and particular knowledge claims, an area of inquiry where history and 
philosophy of science has made far less recent progress than in the understanding of 
values and objectivity. That is, though we may follow Douglas and others in shifting 
an emphasis to how knowledge claims are produced to understand the roles values 
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play in them and the senses in which they are objective, it is not clear that this is 
helpful for characterizing the extent to which these claims are more or less general 
or particular, and what this means for their validity, reliability, or meaningfulness. 
 Consider that we may speak of a “myocardial infarction” as a type of event or as 
a token event. It is not clear whether clinicians who use this language – or language 
of “swollen,” “sharp pain,” or “anxiety” – generally mean to invoke just the type or 
just the token event. Which, or whether they are being ambiguous, will be a matter 
of the pragmatics of medical practice, and is not something that can be decided in 
the current inquiry. Moreover, it is also unclear how clarifying the multiplicity of 
ways science is value-laden and the complexity with which it aims at objectivity 
will aid in characterizing those pragmatics, though I assume in time they will. 
 Consequently, if these remarks about the complexity of objectivity and the role 
played by an antiquated concept of objectivity in the dualist epistemology of med-
icine are cogent, then they suggest at most that the art/science distinction rests on 
shaky ground. If, as has been argued, science is value-laden, then the mere fact 
that what is often called the “art” of medicine requires eliciting patients’ values 
does not entail medicine cannot, therefore, be a science. With objectivity so 
understood, the traditional art/science distinction may thus reduce to an ancient, 
and perhaps intractable puzzle about the relationship between general and par-
ticular knowledge claims. 
 A Role for a Unifi ed Epistemology of Medicine: 
Two Case Studies 
 Absent sound philosophical reasons for adopting a dualist epistemology of medicine, 
I contend it should be rejected because of its pernicious effects, which I describe in 
this section by considering examples from recent work on decision- making in hered-
itary breast and ovarian cancer syndrome (HBOC) and end-of-life care. In both 
cases, one fi nds many aspects of clinical medicine that are routinely understood 
under the rubric of the “art” of medicine, but which are better understood when 
depicted as part of the “science” of medicine, because doing so allows for the assimi-
lation of this research into the domain of unifi ed medical knowledge. 
 Pathophysiology, Psychology, and Social Science 
in Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
 HBOC is defi ned in terms of a known genetic predisposition to breast and ovarian 
cancer. Many factors must be considered in its diagnosis, but the determining one is 
returning a positive result for mutations in the  BRCA1 or  BRCA2 genes (Rubenstein 
 2001 ). In order to qualify for a genetic test, a patient must meet certain criteria, 
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including having a fi rst degree relative with a known mutation, being of Ashkenazi 
Jewish descent, or receiving a diagnosis of breast cancer before age 45 (National 
Cancer Institute  2011 ). If a patient is diagnosed with HBOC, this licenses a number 
of inferences about processes that are occurring in her cells, depending upon the 
mutation she harbors (Turner et al.  2004 ). While much is known about the genetics 
and physiology of this syndrome, the study of HBOC is still in its infancy, so it is 
known with varying degrees of uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, these aspects 
of the clinical science of HBOC surely fall under the rubric of the “science” of 
medicine on any account. 
 However, we know much more about HBOC than simply its pathophysiology. 
We also know how the ways in which clinicians interact with patients may affect 
their decision-making. And, we know what patients’ typical emotional reactions 
will be when faced with the prospects of having HBOC. Appreciating this research, 
described below, on various phenomena arising from typical clinical encounters in 
HBOC suggests that what is often understood as the “art” of medicine is also a 
science, though in the psychological and social sciences. It aims to measure quali-
ties of particular social beings and social relations. And it studies agents who seek 
care, their loved ones, the professionals who provide care, and the relationships 
among them. Through increasing success at such measurement, increasing develop-
ment and application of statistical techniques, increasing conceptual progress, and 
increasing innovation in experimental design, we are learning about these relationships 
in ways that support interventions upon them. Thus, the art and craft of medicine is 
constituted by diverse studies of social relations in medical practice and their appli-
cation to particular moments of patient care. 
 Empirical studies of the psychosocial aspects of HBOC have resulted in a rich 
portrait of what it means to face an HBOC diagnosis, how patients and family mem-
bers make treatment decisions, and what the consequences of their choices com-
monly are. For example, we know that genetic counselors are far more disposed to 
choose genetic testing and prophylactic surgery than their patients (Matloff et al. 
 2000 ). And we know that what is most important to patients who face decisions 
about testing and surgery is information about their test results and their family his-
tory. Yet, also of importance are concerns about the risks of surgery, the timing of 
interventions in their lives, and the impact treatment will have on sexuality (Ray et al. 
 2005 ). Finally, for those who choose testing, we know that irrespective of their test 
results, patients will feel a mixture of sadness, anger, guilt, and relief; and many will 
worry about insurance discrimination (Lynch et al.  1997 ). 
 Though this description of HBOC is abstract and simplifi ed, it suffi ces to illustrate 
both how a complex understanding of objectivity is useful for characterizing the 
scientifi city of medicine and why it is better to understand medical knowledge as 
scientifi c, rather than as both science and art. 
 The principle justifi cation for a dualist epistemology of medicine resides in the 
belief that there are certain aspects of the craft of medicine that are inherently sub-
jective and particular, meaning they are value-laden, and hence, inaccessible to 
scientifi c methods of inquiry. The examples of such aspects given above by Cassell 
are the values of the patient, the idiosyncrasies of clinical judgment, and the 
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emotional infl uence on patient and physician cognition during all aspects of clinical 
interactions. The position argued for here is that these features may also be understood 
as being objective, once a simplistic account of objectivity is identifi ed, challenged, 
and replaced with a more nuanced account. On this view, empirical studies of 
phenomena like clinicians’ biases and patients’ emotional responses to various 
moments in treatment provide knowledge that is objective, and in an important way, 
in the same sense as knowledge of the molecular processes that cause cancer. Both 
types of knowledge are the result of many processes of data collection and infer-
ence. These processes will be objective to varying degrees, if modeled in terms of 
the types of objectivity above. Whereas our knowledge of the molecular patho-
physiology of HBOC may be a product of processes where concordant, convergent, 
and detached objectivity are more salient than other types, it is also true that our 
knowledge of the psychosocial aspects of HBOC are produced by processes where 
concordant, interactive, and value-neutral objectivity play prominent roles. Hence, 
it is not the case that what has been characterized as the art of medicine is incorri-
gible by appeal to scientifi c inquiry; rather, it is, and this entails that there may be a 
science of the art of medicine. Furthermore, just as objective knowledge of patho-
physiology is necessary for the optimal delivery of patient care, so too is objective 
knowledge of the psychosocial aspects of medicine instrumental for optimal care. 
 End-of-Life Care in the Intensive Care Unit 
and the Scientifi city of Medicine 
 Research on decision-making in end-of-life care is another, and perhaps better, case 
where important recent progress has been made in scientifi cally studying aspects of 
care that would traditionally be confi ned to the “art” of medicine. For many people, 
life will end in an institutional setting; indeed, recent studies showed that for over 
65 % of subjects life ended in an institutional setting, including a hospital or nursing 
home; and, for those who died at home, over 60 % received some type of nursing or 
hospice care at home before death (Teno et al.  2004 ). In recent years, clinicians, 
social scientists, and applied ethicists have endeavored to describe how people die in 
institutional settings and to suggest ways for optimizing these most common ways of 
ending life ( e.g. , Kaufman  2005 ). What considering a tiny but representative portion 
of this literature indicates is that, like in the case of HBOC, studies have developed 
signifi cant, empirically justifi ed knowledge describing end-of-life care from the per-
spectives of providers, patients, caregivers, and other stakeholders and decision mak-
ers. In the context of the current argument, this research provides further evidence for 
the view that a dualist epistemology of medicine has pernicious effects: specifi cally, 
if one accepts it, then the knowledge gained by such studies must be dislocated from 
other medical knowledge that is equally important to providing quality end-of-life 
care, namely, that which justifi es scientifi c inferences about a patient’s prognosis. 
With such dislocation there is no coherent way to describe how to take into account 
both how patients understand dying in institutional settings or what it means to 
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provide quality end-of-life care, and how to provide quality medical interventions at 
the end of life. And this is deeply problematic because integrating these different 
types of knowledge is required in end-of-life care, as it is in all medical practice. Yet, 
if one adopts the science/art distinction, one should expect that such an integration is 
not only hopeless, but also impossible, because on that view to try to assimilate art 
into science or  vice versa is to make a category error. 
 In a recent review, physician J. R. Curtis argues that “[Intensive Care Unit] clini-
cians should approach the family conference with the same care and planning that 
they approach other ICU procedures” (Curtis et al.  2001 ). That is, he believes it is 
just as important to understand how to communicate well about end-of-life deci-
sions, as it is to understand how to perform a procedure such as a tracheostomy. 
Moreover, knowledge of how to do both well is not just equally important, it also 
may require the same types of reasoning. 
 As Curtis has shown in many subsequent studies, to be a better communicator 
requires developing an expertise in understanding how physicians communicate 
poorly and how they communicate well. For instance, in a recent paper, he and his 
colleagues show that there are four distinct roles that physicians take on when 
discussing surrogate decision-making regarding life support decisions. Most physi-
cians adopt a collaborative role, defi ned as providing medical information, eliciting 
patient’s values, and making treatment recommendations. However, others adopt 
what they describe as “directive,” “facilitative,” or “informative” roles in the 
decision- making process (White et al.  2010 ). If philosophers are to adequately char-
acterize clinical research such as this, then the dualist epistemology of medicine 
must be rejected and superseded by a more cogent account. 
 Consider other recent work on end-of-life care. A recent study of the psychology 
of clinical decision-making in the ICU shows that physicians’ beliefs about the 
appropriateness of withdrawing life support strongly correlate with whether patients 
in the ICU receive the option to withdraw treatment (Schenker et al.  2012 ). This 
research suggests that by better understanding the mental mechanisms by which 
physicians form beliefs it may be possible in the future to create interventions to 
increase the quality of end-of-life care, in terms of increasing the goodness of fi t 
between presented treatment options and patients’ intuitions about quality of life. 
Consequently, the logic of this research presupposes that by empirically studying 
the “art” of medical practice using common scientifi c methodologies, it will be 
possible to both better understand clinical practice and create empirically derived 
interventions for bettering patient care. 
 As in the case of HBOC, careful attention to research studying various aspects 
of clinical practice and decision-making in end-of-life care indicates that there are 
many instances where scientifi c methods are fruitfully applied to patient care. 
What results are measures of various aspects of patient care that have the promise 
of revolutionizing practice once better understood. Such measures are out of place 
if one joins scholars like Cassell in assuming that there is an art to medicine that 
cannot be studied scientifi cally, and for which no progress can be made other than 
by the apprenticeship model. Given the value of these measures, it is only reason-
able to conclude that the time has come to move past the dualist epistemology of 
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medicine and to begin the process of crafting a new, coherent epistemology that is 
multifaceted while also remaining unifi ed in recognizing the persistent scientifi c-
ity of medical theory and practice. 
 Conclusion 
 This paper argues a dualist epistemology of medicine has signifi cant and pernicious 
implications. It implies that certain clinical knowledge – such as, of patients’ histo-
ries, values, and preferences, and how to integrate them in decision-making – can-
not be scientifi c knowledge. Moreover, the distinction between an “art” and 
“science” of medicine rests on fl awed and antiquated conceptions of science, as 
characterized above. By considering recent progress on the question of whether 
science is value-free, and relatedly, the conceptual complexity of objectivity and 
subjectivity, it has been argued there may be varying degrees of objectivity pertain-
ing to various aspects of clinical medicine. Hence, what is often understood as 
constituting the “art” of medicine is also amenable to objective methods of inquiry, 
and so, may be understood as “science”. Therefore, the popular philosophical 
distinction between the art and science of medicine ought to be rejected and in its 
place a unifi ed, multifaceted epistemology of medicine should be developed. 
 The upshot of rejecting a dualist epistemology of medicine is that it allows one 
to make explicit and to critically evaluate the role of values in medical science. It 
stands to reason that different aspects of medicine, such as the pathophysiological 
and psychosocial, will have very different degrees of objectivity, correlative with 
the different roles values play in them. But, these should be understood as differ-
ences of degree, not in kind. Thus, it is better to see medicine as an integrative 
science aiming at multi-level explanation in the service of patient health, rather than 
as a science on the one hand and an art on the other. What remains an open question, 
however, is whether issues arising from the generality and particularity of knowl-
edge claims in medicine continue to be salient in light of new understandings of the 
complexity of objectivity and roles of values in science. This is but one of the 
important issues facing those who aim toward a unifi ed epistemology of medicine. 
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